Habitus (from the Latin habitus, derived from habere, “to have,” “to hold,” or “to possess”) designates a stable and enduring disposition, whether acquired or infused, that inclines a being to act in a certain manner. It is neither a particular act nor a merely passive capacity, but a relatively permanent quality that perfects a faculty and facilitates its operation.
More specifically
The notion of habitus occupies a central place in the philosophy of Aristotle and in the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Between pure potency and completed act, habitus constitutes a stable disposition that makes a certain activity possible. Thus, science is a habitus of the intellect, just as virtue is a habitus of the will or of the appetitive powers.
Habitus differs from a mere natural aptitude. A faculty may possess the capacity to act without being disposed to act well. Habitus is precisely that qualitative determination which perfects a power and enables it to attain its proper end more easily. It is therefore an intrinsic principle of action rooted in the subject itself.
For Aristotle, the moral virtues are habitus acquired through the repetition of acts in accordance with reason. By performing just actions, a person becomes just; by performing courageous actions, he becomes courageous. Habitus thus manifests the manner in which actions progressively shape the very being of the one who performs them.
The Christian tradition adopted and expanded this doctrine. Alongside acquired habitus, there exist infused habitus bestowed by God. The theological virtues—faith, hope, and charity—do not result from mere human training but from a supernatural participation in the divine life. They are habitus that render man capable of acting toward an end that surpasses his natural capacities.
Habitus should not be confused with “habit” in its ordinary sense. A habit may be purely mechanical or external, whereas habitus designates an interior quality that genuinely transforms the faculty concerned. It affects the very structure of the subject and contributes to its perfection.
From a metaphysical perspective, habitus reveals that being is not fixed but capable of qualitative growth. Between what a being presently is and what it is called to become, there exist intermediary dispositions that make its perfection possible. Habitus thus expresses the continuity between being and action: actions shape being, and being thus shaped in turn generates actions corresponding to its disposition.
This notion also plays an important role in epistemology. Every genuine form of knowledge presupposes certain intellectual habitus that enable the mind to grasp principles, reason correctly, and attain truth. Education therefore appears less as the accumulation of information than as the gradual formation of intellectual and moral habitus.
Habitus may thus be understood as a “second nature.” Without suppressing freedom, it orients and facilitates it. It represents the enduring inscription of a manner of being within the subject, whether virtue or vice, knowledge or ignorance, natural perfection or supernatural participation.
Further reading
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II;
- Aristotle, Categories, VIII;
- Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, qq. 49–70;
- Saint Thomas Aquinas, De virtutibus;
- Étienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas;
- Josef Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues;
- Jean Borella, The Meaning of the Supernatural (Le sens du surnaturel);